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[L. A. No. 20243. In Bank. May 3, 1948.] 
LEO GALLAGHER, Petitioner, v. MUNICIPAL COURT OF 
THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES et a!., Respondents. 
[1] Contemp.t-Misconduct of Attorneys.-While the fact that a 
woman is named by jurors as having attempted to influence 
them does not give her or her attorney a right to take part in 
proceedings in the case to determine possible jury tampering, 
a mere mistaken act by the attorney, such as a request for the 
privilege of cross-examining and an attempt to cross-examine 
the jurors, cannot render him guilty of contempt where he 
does not resort to deceit or to wilful obstruction of the orderly 
processes, where there is nothing contemptuous in the words 
used by him, and where the judge does not caution him re-
garding his demeanor, facial expressions or tone of voice. 
[2a,2b] ld.-Misconduct of Attorneys.-Wbere in a proceeding 
to determine possible jury tampering the judge directed that 
a woman named by jurors as having attempted to influence 
them be taken by the bailiff to the district attorney's office, 
she was entitled to be heard in person or through her attor-
ney, and the attorney was not guilty of contempt in asking 
the judge the purpose of such order and whether his client 
was under arrest, in the absence of any showing that the words 
used by him were contemptuous, that his conduct tended to 
interrupt the due course of the examination, or that the judge 
had warned him that his tone of voice and facial expressions 
were offensive. 
[8] ld.-Misconduct of Attorneys.-An attorney has the duty to 
protect the interests of his client. He has a right to press 
[2] Necessity and sufficiency of making and recording subsidiary 
or detailed findings supporting adjudication of direct contempt, 
note, 154 A.L.R. 1227. See, also, 5 Cal.Jur. 900; 12 Am.Jur. 396. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1-3] Contempt, § 15. 
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legitimate argument and to protest an erroneous court ruling, 
without on that account being chargeable as being in contempt 
of court. 
PROCEEDING in certiorari to' review an order of the 
Municipal Court of the City of Los Angeles and Byron J. Wal-
ters, Judge thereof, adjudging contempt of court. Order 
annulled. 
Katz, Gallagher & Margolis, Charles J. Katz, A. L. Wirin, 
Ben Margolis, Samuel W. Blum and Nathaniel Holtzman for 
Petitioner. 
Clore Warne, George Altman, Morris Cohn, Loren Miller 
and Charles Christopher, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Peti-
tioner. 
Ray L. Chesebro, City Attorney, Donald M. Redwine, AB-
sistant City Attorney, and John L. Bland, Deputy City Attor-
ney, for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-In this proceeding in certiorari petitioner, 
an attorney, seeks to annul an order of the Los Angeles Munic-
ipal Court adjudging him in contempt of court and commit-
ting him to the city jail for five days. The alleged contempt 
occurred in open court during the course of a judicial pro-
ceeding. 
The order adjudging petitioner in contempt was the cul-
mination of an extraordinary sequence of events. In the course 
of a jury trial, three of the jurors complained to the trial 
judge that a Mrs. Hill approached them in the corridor of 
the courthouse and conversed with them. The judge declared 
a recess, stating: "The court will examine into an alleged 
and reported matter of interference with the jurors in this 
case." Mr. Allen, counsel for the defendants in the recessed 
trial, advised Mrs. Hill that she should be represented by 
counsel. Mrs. Hill told him that she wished to retain peti-
tioner who was in the courtroom at that time. Petitioner 
talked to Mrs. Hill and, upon her direct request, consented 
to represent her. 
The trial judge conducted the examination and caused the 
first witness to be sworn. The pertinent portions of the pro-
ceedings are as follows: 
"THE CoURT: Mrs. Morehouse, did someone approach you 
and make a remark' 
-) 
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MR. GALLAGHER [Petitioner]: Just a minute, if the Court 
please. My name is Leo Gallagher and I am attorney for Mrs. I 
Hill. I am going to object to that question as a leading ques- 'i 
tion propounded by the Court to the witness. 
"THE COURT: Mrs. Hill is not on trial. I am making an 
investigation, counsel. 
"MR. GALLAGHER: I understand that. 
"THE COURT: You are attorney for Mrs. Hill' 
"MR. GALLAGHER: Yes. 
"THE CoURT: The objection is overrpled." 
The trial judge then questioned the witness and obtained 
her version of a conversation with Mrs. Hill. 
"THE COURT: That's aU. 
"MR. GALLAGHER: I would like to ask a question. Did you 
have a sign across the front of your chest indicating that you 
were a juror' 
"THE COURT: I don't know that you have any place in 
here. I am investigating this case. 
"MR. GALLAGHER: You want a fair investigation, don't you' 
"THE CoURT: It is not a trial. 
"Ma. GALLAGHER: But you want a fair investigation' 
"THE COURT: It is not a trial. 
"MR. GALLAGHER: I know that, but you want a fair inves-
tigation' 
"THE CoURT: Step down, madam. 
"Ma. GALLAGHER: Don't you want a fair investigation of 
this' 
"THE CoURT: Mr. Gallagher, will you please stay out of 
these proceedings f " 
The judge nevertheless allowed Mr. Allen to question the 
witness before dismissing her. The second complaining juror 
was then sworn and examined at length by the court and Mr • 
.Allen, after which occurred the following interchange: 
"Ma. GALLAGHER: I would like to ask a question. 
"THE COURT: Denied. . 
"Ma. GALLAGHER: Denied! You are Dot going to let me 
ask her a question' 
"THE COURT: Ca11 Mrs. Carlquist. 
"Ma. GALLAGHER: As a friend of the Court I would like 
to ask a question so that you will get a full picture of what 
happened here. 
"Tm: COURT: Denied." 
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The third complaining juror was next sworn and examined 
first by the court and then by Mr. Allen. After they finished, 
petitioner spoke to the court: 
"MR. GALLAGHER: I would like to ask a question. 
"THE COURT: Denied. Mrs. Hill will be taken by the Bailiff 
of this court to the District Attorney's office. 
"MR. GALLAGHER: To the District Attorney's office f 
c'THE COURT : Yes. 
"MR. GALLAGHER: For what purpose, please' Are you 
putting her under arrest, if the Court please T Is she under 
arrest f Will you kindly answer that question, Judge, whether 
she is under arrest at this time T Won't you hear my argument' 
"THE COURT: Mr. Gallagher, you are declared in contempt 
of court and sentenced to five days in the City Jail. The Clerk 
will prepare the commitment and take Mr. Gallagher into 
custody. " 
The order of the trial judge stated: "Whereas, said state-
ments were made by said Leo Gallagher in a loud, insolent, 
aggressive, belligerent, boisterous, harsh, offensive and con-
temptuous tone of voice and with a sneering and contemptu-
ous expression on his face and a threatening demeanor toward 
said court and the judge thereof and in disobedience of the 
lawful orders of the court, and in a disorderly and insolent 
manner toward the judge of said court. That said statements 
and conduct of said Leo Gallagher tended to and did interrupt 
the due course of said trial and did obstruct the administra-
tion of justice and interfere with the orderly proceedings of 
the court at said time and place aforesaid, and said state-
ments, acts and conduct did tend to and did bring the court 
into contempt and tended to and did interrupt its proceed-
ings and did impair respect for said court and the judge 
thereof and their authority, and tended to and did breach the 
peace of said judicial proceedings and created a violent dis-
turbance thereof, interfering with the due and orderly course 
of said trial. . . ." 
According to the order of the trial judge, the alleged con-
tempt took place while the court was "engaged in the hearing 
on a matter of tampering with jurors" in a case then before 
the court. The trial judge presumably commenced the inves-
tigation to determine whether the jury had been influenced, 
since it was possible that Mrs. Hill's alleged conduct would 
lead him to declare a mistrial. Respondent contends that 
Mrs. Hill was not entitled, as a matter of constitutional right, 
) 
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to interrogate the witnesses through her counsel, since she 
was not charged with any crime and was not called as a wit-
ness. Mrs. Hill was apparently required to remain in the 
courtroom during the investigation. This investigation might 
have resulted in the filing of a complaint charging Mrs. Hill 
with the felony of jury tampering (Pen. Code, § 95) or with 
some other crime. (See Pen. Code, § 849.) It is not disputed 
that Mrs. Hill was entitled to advice of counsel and to the 
presence of her counsel in the event that she should be called 
as a witness or should be charged with a crime, and the fact 
that the hearing did not immediately, result in the filing of 
a complaint does not alter the seriousness of her position. 
Indeed, she was taken to the district attorney under arrest, 
for some undisclosed purpose, at the conclusion of the exam-
ination. 
[1] Respondent contends, however, that despite Mrs. Hill's 
right to be accompanied and advised by counsel, her counsel 
was not authorized to cross-examine witnesses and to inject 
himself into the proceedings unless and until Mrs. Hill was I 
called as a witness or charged with a public offense. It is 
unnecessary to hold that petitioner, as counsel for Mrs. Hill, 
had any such right. It is sufficient merely to state that there 
was no impropriety in his attempt to take part in the inves-
tigation. Mrs. Hill and petitioner had no way of knowing 
how the investigation might affect her rights, but they had 
reasonable grounds for the conclusion that she would be 
affected in some way. 
The trial judge acted within the law and within reason-
able limits of judicial discretion in denying to petitioner any 
participation in the inquiry that he was conducting into the 
matter of possible tampering with the jury. Mr. Gallagher was 
not an attorney representing any party in the case on trial; 
the fact that Mrs. Hill was named by jurors as having per-
haps improperly communicated with them did not give her 
or her attorney a right to take part in proceedings in that 
ease. But certainly a mere mistaken act by counsel cannot 
render him in contempt of court. Even if a legal proposi-
tion is untenable, counsel may properly urge it in good faith; 
he may do 80 even though he may not expect to be successful, 
provided of course, that he does not resort to deceit or to 
wilful obstruction of the orderly processes. Here the transcript 
indicates-and there seems to be nothing whatsoever equivocal 
about this-that petitioner respected the rulings of the court 
) 
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and abided by them down to the point where the judge directeo 
that "Mrs. Hill will be taken by the Bailiff of this court to the 
District Attorney's office." 
Petitioner;s participation in the investigation consisted of 
his attempt to cross-examine witnesses who testified that Mrs. 
Hill had tried to influence them while they were acting as 
jurors. There was nothing contemptuo~ in the words used 
by petitioner in this connection, and the record shows that 
the trial judge was not concerned with petitioner's manner 
but was determined to bar him from participation in the pro-
ceedings. The judge did not caution petitioner or even remark 
about petitioner's demeanor or facial expressions or tone of 
voice. Thus, although petitioner had no right to cross-examine 
witnesses in an investigation to determine whether a mistrial 
should be declared, petitioner cannot be held in contempt for 
requesting the privilege of doing so. After the judge asked 
petitioner to "stay out of these proceedings," petitioner 
directed his requests to the court and these requests were 
summarily denied. Until the trial judge gave his order to 
the bailiff, therefore, petitioner did nothing to interfere with 
the normal course of the investigation, and nowhere up to 
that point does the record show any criticism or admonition 
by the trial judge regarding petitioner's conduct or manner. 
[2a] When Mrs. Hill was ordered taken to the district 
attorney's office, petitioner asked, • • To the District A ttor-
ney's office T ••• For what purpose, please Y Are you putting 
her under arrest, if the Court please T Is she under arrest 7 
Will you kindly answer that question, Judge, whether she is 
under arrest at this timet Won't you hear my argumentT" 
These were the statements that led directly to the order of 
contempt. When the trial judge directed that Mrs. Hill be 
taken by the bailiff to the district attorney's office, he changed 
the character of the proceedings. At that point he went be-
yond the bounds of conducting the trial of the case before 
him. That order was not material to the determination of 
any issue in the case; it directly affected Mrs. Hill and entitled 
her to be heard in person or through her counsel. Mr. Gal-
lagher's conduct from that point on is to be appraised in 
relation to representation of a client under arrest and not in 
relation to the rulings that had been made during the inquiry 
that was part of or incidental to the case on trial. Mrs. Hill 
had a right to know the purpose of ordering her into the cus-
tody of the bailiff and, since she was represented by counsel 
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present at the time, her counsel was a proper person to dis-
cover it; indeed: he would clearly have been guilty of derelic-
tion of duty to his client if he failed to do so. The trial judge, 
in turn, as the one who made the order of disposition, W88 
the logical person to answer counsel's questions. 
The record therefore shows that an attorney has been ad-
judged in contempt of court for regularly and faithfully 
representing the interests of his client. There is nothing con-
temptuous in ptltitioner's words and nothing in the record to 
show that his conduct tended to interrupt the due course of 
the examination. Accordingly, the question presented in this 
proceeding is whether the trial court's description of petition-
er's facial expressions and tone of voice is sufficient to support 
the order of contempt, when all that appears from the record 
shows that petitioner addressed the court properly in the reg-
ular course of litigation. This question has been considered 
in several cases by the District Courts of Appeal, but with 
apparently con1licting results. 
In re Shortridge, 5 Cal.App. 371 [90 P. 478], was a ease 
in which an attorney was held in contempt for addressing the 
court while a witness was being examined, after the court 
had ordered him not to do so. Petitioner was discharged on ' 
habeas corpus because the District Court of Appeal decided 
that the recital of facts in the order was insufficient; the 
opinion of the court stated that the petitioner might have had 
the right and the duty to address the court and, in the absence 
of additional information, the mere fact that he did so was 
an insufficient ground for contempt. With respect to a state-
ment in the contempt order that petitioner's conduct was 
"boisterous and offensive" the court stated that "reading 
this statement in connection with the context in which it 
occurs, it is clear that the order means no more by this than 
to state a conclusion from the fact that he persisted in address-
ing the court against the order of the court." (In re Short-
ridge, 5 Cal.App.378 [90 P. 478].) 
In Platnauer v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.App. 463 [I6a 
P. 2371. petitioner was counsel for the contestee in an election 
contest. Petitioner objected to the use of the county clerk'8 
deputies in counting the ballots, on the ground that the clerk 
was prejudiced against his client. The trial judge refused 
to hear his argument, ordered petitioner to sit down and told 
petitioner's associate to cond~ct the case for the contestee. 
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formed him that petitioner could participate in the case but 
could not conduct it. When petitioner made an objection to 
the introduction of certain evidencc immediately thereafter, 
he was adjudged in contempt. Thc trial judge stated in his 
order that petitioner refused to sit down; that he continued 
to argue with the court; that he resisted the bailiff; and that 
he created noise and confusion in open court by loud talking 
and tripping over chairs. The District Court of Appeal an-
nulled the order on certiorari, finding that the trial judge had 
been arbitrary and that petitioner had used respectful language 
in the performance of his duty. The court stated the following 
rule as applicable to an attorney: "If, in discharging his 
duty, he happens to be persistent or vehement or both in the 
presentation of his points, he is still, nevertheless, within his 
legitimate rights as an attorney, so long as his language is 
not offensive or in contravention of the common rules of 
decorum and propriety. As well may be expected in forensic 
polemics, he cannot always be right, and may wholly be wrong 
in his position upon the legal question under argument, and 
to the mind of the court so plainly wrong that the latter 
may conceive that it requires no enlightenment from the ar-
gument of counsel. But, whether right or wrong, he has the 
right to an opportunity to present his theory of the case on 
any occasion where the exigency of the pending point in his 
judgment requires or justifies it." (Platnauer v. Superior 
Oourt, supra, at p. 475.) 
Ourran v. Superior Oourt, 72 Cal.App. 258 [236 P. 975], 
is closely analogous to the instant case. There petitioner 
asked a question of a witness and the district attorney ob-
jected to the form of the question. The court sustained the 
objection and petitioner assigned the ruling as error. The 
trial judge then ordered petitioner to sit down while ques-
tioning the witness. Petitioner asserted his right to stand 
up while questioning witnesses, and was adjudged in con-
tempt. The trial court's order used a number of adjectives 
to describe petitioner's conduct: " ... said statements above 
outlined were disorderly, contemptuous and insolent to the 
Court on your part . . . and directly tended to interrupt the 
proceedings of said court and to impair the respect due to 
the authority of said court . . . . Said statements addreSRed 
to the court were spoken in a very loud, combative and 
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tonationsand loud expressions by you were disorderly, con· 
temptuous and insulting to the Court. . .. " (Curran v. 
S1tpcrior Court, supra, at pp. 262.263.) 
The District Court of Appeal annulled the order on cer· 
tiorari. It stated that "The language used by petitioner wa.q 
not in itself insulting, but was brief and directly to the 
point," and that the court's order was "due to a momentary 
forgetfulness of the rights of petitioner as an officer of the 
court in the discharge of his duty to his client and the public, 
and [the order] was not made necessary or proper by any 
preceding act or misconduct on th~ part of petitioner." 
(Curran v. Superior Court, supra, at pp. 265.266.) With 
respect to petitioner's tone of voice and manner, the court 
quoted with approval from the Platnauer case, and added: 
"While the courts in other jurisdictions have held that the 
tQne of voice and attitude of counsel in making on proper 
occasions proper statements to the court may constitute con· 
tempt, yet we are reluctant to extend the rule farther than 
was done in the Platnauer and Shortridge cases, supra, and 
hold that the occasion and the language being proper the in-
tonations of the voice, the vehemence of the objections or the 
physical attitude of counsel in making them, would alone 
support the conclusion of the judge that such behavior was 
disorderly, contemptuous, or insolent toward the court and 
tended to interrupt the due course of the trial, and thus sub-
ject the offender to a judgment of fine and imprisonment. 
The relations between court and counsel may and often do 
during the course of a trial become strained; mutual con-
ditions of irritation may be created in the heat of debate, 
leading to tones and demeanor which in other situations 
would clearly manifest contempt but which, under the con-
ditions often existing in a hotly contested criminal case, such 
as is indicated hy the record here, should lead to no such con-
clusion. Much must be pardoned under the circuIDStances 
to the infirmities of human nature, and as much excused by 
the liberty of speech if in the heat of a trial the expressions 
of counsel are not always coldly precise, or his tones un-
marked by excitement or even anger." (Curran v. Superior 
Court, ,upra, at 267-268. See also, Bennett v. Superior Court, 
73 Cal.App.2d 203, 225 [166 P.2d 318] ; Ex parte Crenshaw, 
96 Tex. Crim. 654 [259 S.W. 587, 31 A.L.R. 1181).) 
It is contended that the foregoing cases are opposed in the 
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holds that the manner and tone used by an attorney may 
alone constitute contempt regardless of the propriety of his 
remarks. Although such statements can be found in the 
cases of In re Hallinan, 126 Cal.App. 121 [14 P.2d 797], and 
Rose v. Superior Oourt, 140 Cal.App. 418 [35 P.2d 605], an 
examination of the facts contained in those cases shows that 
they rest upon a different basis. 
In the Hallinan case, the contempt order was occasioned 
by the attorney's persistent interruption of the district at-
torney during the latter's closing argument. Petitioner and 
the district attorney had stipulated that petitioner's objec-
tions would be saved for him in order to expedite the re-
mainder of the trial. The trial judge ordered petitioner 
several times to refrain from interrupting the district at-
torney, reminding him of his stipulation. Petitioner never-
theless repeatedly disobeyed the court and was finally found 
in contempt. The trial judge's order recited the facts and 
added that petitioner's conduct, "in manner, tone and method, 
was disorderly, contemptuous, and that his attitude and be-
havior toward this Court, while the Court was holding said 
session, was insolent .... " (In re Hallinan, supra, at p. 
125.) The District Court of Appeal stated in its opinion 
that petitioner's persistent interruptions contrary to the 
stipulation and to the orders of the trial judge constituted 
contempt. The court went on to state, however, that" .•• 
whether or not petitioner had the right to interrupt said pro-
ceedings for the purpose mentioned, it is apparent that the 
manner in which he conducted himself in seeking to exercise 
such right brought him clearly within the operation of the 
provisions of said section 1209 [Code Civ. Proc.], and sub-
jected him to punishment for contempt .... Under all the 
authorities it is held that a contempt may be shown either by 
language or behavior, and that although the language itself 
may not be contemptuous, it may become so if uttered in an 
insolent or defiant manner; and in determining whether the 
language used was a contempt, regard must be had not only 
to the very words used but to the surrounding circumstances, 
the connections in which they were used, the tone, the look, 
the manner and the emphasis." (In re Hallinan, supra, at 
p. 128.) 
In Rose v. Superior Oourt, 140 Cal.App. 418 [35 P.2d 605], 
petitioner asked questions during the empanelling of the 
jury that had been asked and answered many times. The 
) 
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trial judge directed petitioner to refrain frol1l repeating such 
questions and finally, immediately after an admonition, pe-
titioner proceeded to repeat the same question; he did this in 
a sneering and loud manner, according to the order of con-
tempt. The court again cautioned petitioner but he per-
sisted in his manner of questioning and directed sarcastic 
remarks to the trial judge. When the trial judge ordered 
the jury to disregard certain of petitioner's remarks, the 
latter stated, •• I demand an apology for that." One of the 
jurors asked the trial judge to be excused siJ;lce petitioner was 
so rude that she did not feel that she could treat his client 
fairly. Petitioner continued in his behavior, however, and 
threatened and shouted at witnesses after still other admoni- I 
tions by the trial judge. The District Court of Appeal of 
course refused to annul the order of contempt; but in affirm-
ing the order, the court quoted at length from In re Hallinan 
to show that petitioner's manner alone constituted contempt. 
(Rose v. Superior Court, supra, at pp. 425-427. See also, 
Gillen v. Municipal Court, 37 Cal.App.2d 428, 431 [99 P.2d 
555], where the court held that petitioner's words were con-
temptuous in themselves but added that the trial judge I 
~orrectly noted in his order the tone and manner in which 
the words were spoken.) 
The results reached in both the Hallinan and Rose cases 
were undoubtedly correct. We cannot agree with the dictum 
contained in those cases, however, that if the words spoken 
were proper the order of contempt must be affirmed on the 
basis of a mere recital in the order that the •• tone, the look, 
the manner and the emphasis" were contemptuous. We find 
greater wisdom in the reasoning of the Platnauer and Curran 
cases, which squarely considered the question of tone and 
manner and decided that if the record fails to reveal im-
proper conduct on the part of the attorney and does reveal 
arbitrary or incorrect rulings by the trial judge, the order 
of contempt must be annulled despite the recitals in the 
judge's order th:1t the attorney was boisterous or insolent. 
In the present case, the purported contempt is alleged to have 
extended over many pages of court record, yet no mention is 
made of it in the record. The record therefore fails to dis-
close a contemptuous interference by counsel with the progress 
of the trial. 
Broadly speaking, judges are empowered to punish sum-
marily for contempt of court in order to facilitate the orderly 
-
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administr3tion of justice. Disobedience of court orders tends 
to lessen the effect of those orders; intemperate behavior in 
the course of a trial, as illustrated by In re Hallinan and 
Rose v. Superior Court, supra, lessens the mastery of the 
trial judge over the progress of the proceedings and thus 
tends to obstruct the course of the trial. Considerable sum-
mary power, not usually available to the officers of any other 
branch of the government, is therefore vested in judges. If 
that power is not wisely exercised it can readily become an 
instrument of oppression. In a summary contempt proceed-
ing the judge who metes out the punishment is usually the 
injured party and the prosecutor as well. Since such a situa-
tion invites caprice, appellate courts almost without exception 
require that the order adjudging a person in direct contempt 
of court recite in detail the facts constituting the alleged 
transgression rather than the bare conclusions of the trial 
judge. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1211; see anno., 154 A.L.R. 1227.) 
This rule in itself demonstrates, if only by implication, that 
some objective support must be present to support the order 
of contempt. If a trial judge had only to state that the 
contemnor raised his voice and twisted his features, no con-
tempt order could be attacked. The well-recognized principle 
that in a criminal contempt proceeding the accused is afforded 
many of the protections provided in regular criminal cases 
would be rendered meaningless. (Wilde v. Superior Court, 
53 Cal.App.2d 168, 177 [127 P.2d 560] ; see, Dangel on Con-
tempt, §§ 162 et seq.); and the burden of proof would be 
sustained by the SUbjective reactions of the offended judicial 
officer. The vagaries of human temperament alone cast doubt 
upon the wisdom of applying the dictum of In re Hallinan to 
a case where the facts do not show the aggravated misconduct 
present in that case. 
Another consideration is the fundamental interest of the 
public in maintaining an independent bar. Attorneys must 
be given a substantial freedom of expression in representing 
their clients. "An advocate is at liberty, when addressing 
the Court in regular course, to combat and contest strongly 
any adverse views of the Judge or Judges expressed on the 
case during its argument, to object to and protest against 
any course which the Judge may take and which the advocate 
thinks irregular or detrimental to the interests of his client, 
and to caution juries against any interference by the Judge 
with their functions, or with the advocate when addressing 
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them, or against any strong view adverse to his client ex-
pressed by the presiding Judge upon the facts of a case before 
the verdict of the jury thereon. An advocate ought to be 
allowed freedom and latitude both in speech and in the con-
duct of his client's case." (Oswald, Contempt of Court (3d 
ed.), pp. 56-57. See, People v. Rongetti, 344 Ill. 107, 122 
(176 N.E. 292].) The public interest in an independent bar 
would be subverted if judges were allowed to punish at-
torneys summarily for contempt on purely subjective reac-
tions to their conduct or statements. 
[3] An attorney has the duty to protect the interests of 
his client. He has a right to press legitimate argument and 
to protest an erroneous ruling. It is reported in Oswald on 
Contempt of Court that the following interchange occurred 
between Erskine and Buller, J.: "At length Erskine said, 
'I stand here as an advocate for a brother citizen, and 
I desire that the word "only" be recorded;' whereupon Buller, 
J., said, 'Sit down, sir I remember your duty or I shall be 
obliged to proceed in another manner,'-to which Erskine re-
torted, 'Your Lordship may proceed in whatever manner you 
think fit. I know my duty as well as your Lordship knows 
yours. I shall not alter my conduct.' The Judge took no 
notice of this reply. Lord Campbell speaks of the conduct of 
Erskine as 'a noble stand for the independence of the Bar.' " 
(Oswald, (3d ed.), pp. 51-52.) The foregoing quotation is 
illustrative of the rule in the Platnauer and Curran eases, 
that an attorney may assert that which he believes to be cor-
rect in a forthright manner, if he is acting in the due course 
of a judicial proceeding. (Matter of Botwein, 291 N.Y. 116, 
122-123 [51 N.E.2d 669].) 
[Zb] We do not mean to suggest, by anything said herein, 
that it is impossible for an attorney to subject a judge to 
ridienle and insult by intonations and gestures accompanying 
words wholly innocuous, or that, in such event, the judge 
is powerless to protect the dignity of the court. We merely· 
recognize, as anyone must, that such a thing would be most 
unusual, and that an attorney so skilled in the art of speech 
and at the same time so lacking in an understanding of his ! 
obligations, could be curbed by first warning him of his mis- . 
conduct, and, if he persisted, by disciplinary action. In the 
preEellt case, however, petitioner was never warned that his 
tone of voice was "loud, insolent, aggressive, belligerent, 
boisterous, barsh, offensive and contemptuous" or that there 
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was a "sneering and contemptuous expression" on his face. 
The record does not show that the trial judge rebuked him 
for his alleged "threatening demeanor" or his "disorderly 
and insolent manner." The only ~arning to petitioner was 
to refrain from participation in the investigation; it was 
when petitioner endeavored to discover whether his client 
was under arrest that he was declared to be in contempt. 
Nor does the record reveal that petitioner disobeyed the law-
ful orders of the court. After he was told to "stay out of 
these proceedings" he asked no questions of the witness. He 
thereafter requested the court to be heard. The trial judge 
did not censure him for these requests, but promptly denied 
them. His final request for information regarding the arrest 
of his client, which resulted in the order of contempt, was not 
in disobedience of any lawful order of the court. 
The record shows, therefore, only that an attorney was 
persistent in his efforts to determine what was to be done 
with his client., who was being escorted to the district at-
torney, presumably under arrest. The heat of courtroom 
debate, particularly where liberty is concerned, often gives 
rise to persistence on the part of counsel. If the words used 
by counsel are respectful and pertinent to the matter before 
the court, it is not unnecessarily burdensome to require the 
judge first to warn the attorney that his tone and facial ex-
pressions are offensive and tend to interrupt the due course 
of the proceeding. Otherwise, attorneys could be subjected 
to fines and jail sentences because of personal annoyance and 
pique on the part of trial judges; and these penalties could 
be rendered unassailable, as is contended here, by lengthy 
recitals in the orders of contempt respecting the demeanor of 
the conteJnner. There is nothing in the reported decisions or 
in the experience of our courts that makes necessary such an 
extraordinary authority on the part of the trial judge. In-
deed, the recognition of such an authority would involve the 
surrender of a substantial amount of the independence of the 
bar, and in many instances would deprive litigants of a fair 
hearing. 
The order adjudging petitioner in contempt is annulled. 
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
SHENK, J.-I dissent. 
This case comcs directly within the rulc of the eases {In re 
Rollinan, 126 Cal.App. 121 [14 P.2d 797] ; Rose v. Superior 
) 
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Court, 140 Cal.App. 418 [35 P.2d 605]) which the majority 
opinion refuses to follow but seeks to distinguish for insufficient 
reasons. By disapproving the general doctrine followed in 
those cases the majority opinion has upset the settled rule con-
cerning the scope of inquiry in a certiorari proceeding to re-
wew an order of contempt. 
For the purpose of determining the lawful exercise of juris-
diction in a summary contempt proceeding the recitals of the 
facts in the order of commitment must be deemed to be true. 
There is no procedure for the taking of evidence to contradict 
the facts so recited. This the majority 'opinion implicitly 
concedes; and it is not questioned that the recitals of the at-
torney's tone, manner and attitude, being matters within the 
observation of the court, are findings of fact. (Bose v. Su-
perior Court, supra, 140 Cal.App. at 426; Gt1len v. Municipal 
Court, 37 Cal.App.2d 428,431 [99 P.2d 555], with citation of 
In re Hallinan, supra.) 
A court is the judge of its own con tempts, its judgment is 
subject to review only on the question of jurisdiction, and 
the judgment of contempt is valid if the recital of facts therein 
shows acts which come within the legal definition of a direct 
contempt. (Otis v. Superior Court, 148 Cal. 129 [82 P. 853] ; 
In re Hallinan, supra.) As said in Ex Parte Terry, 128 U.S. 
289 [9 8.Ct. 77, 32 L.Ed. 405], whether the attorney's conduct 
justified the punishment, was for the court to determine under 
its responsibility to do justice and to maintain its own au-
thority, and its findings upon the facts are conclusive. 
The foregoing rules are of long standing and are sound 
guiding principles for both trial and appellate courts in order 
to maintain the balance between the required respect for ju-
dicial authority and the asserted necessity for an independent 
bar. Abrogation thereof would destroy the functional power 
of the court. 
It is now held by the majority that the requirement for 
the jurisdictional recital of facts in the contempt order is not 
complied with merely by stating in the order that the words 
uttered· by the attorney were •• in a loud, insolent, aggressive, 
belligerent, boisterous, harsh, offensive and contemptuous tone 
of voice and with a sneering and contemptuous expression on 
his face and a threatening demeanor toward" the court and 
the judge, and "in a disorderly and insolent manner," fol-
lowed by the conclusion that such manner and conduct tended 
to and did interrupt the due course of the trial and interfered 
-
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with the orderly proceedings of the court. It should not be 
required, as it would now seem to be, that the court have a 
sound-recording device and a motion picture camera in effec-
tual operation at all times in the courtroom in order to make 
a record· in the trial or proceeding of the insolent tone of 
voice and the offensive nature of the conduct of the attorney, 
including his facial expressions, before its recital of the facts 
may be taken as true and be sufficient to show that its order 
was not arbitrary or in excess of jurisdiction. The majority 
opinion does not question that the constant interruptions 
and disobedience of the court's rulings, in respectful words 
but in the manner and with the intemperate tones and atti-
tudes which tend to interfere with the due course of ths 
proceeding would constitute contempt. However, before the 
court may commit the contemner it is required that the facts 
so found must also be shown by the record of the proceedings, 
that is, by appropriate admonitions and warnings regarding 
the attorney's tone and manner. In other words, a record of 
repetition of rulings and admonitions to obey, the continued 
disobedience on the part of the attorney, together with the 
findings of other matters of tone, expression, and conduct 
within the court's observation, no longer support the exercise 
of jurisdiction to declare a direct contempt. 
Section 1209 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: "The 
following acts or omissions in respect to a court of justice, 
or proceedings therein, are contempts of the authority of the 
court: 1. Disorderly, contemptuous, or insolent behavior to-
ward the judge while holding court, tending to interrupt the 
due course of a trial or other judicial proceeding; 2. ..• 
boisterous conduct • • . tending to interrupt the due course 
of a trial or other judicial proceeding; . . ." The law thus 
imposes upon the judicial officer the duty to see that court 
proceedings are conducted in an orderly manner. Confidence 
must be reposed somewhere in the matter of upholding the 
authority and integrity of the courts as a forum for the orderly 
settlement of disputes. And indeed it will come as a sur-
prise to those charged with the orderly conduct of judicial 
proceedings that credence will not be accorded the recital of 
matters within their observation and which cannot always 
conveniently be reflected by the record of the trial or proceed-
ing. In my opinion the line bas correctly been drawn by the 
prior decisions of our appellate courts. The additional ele-
ment now required before jurisdiction attaches to declare 
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contemptuous an attorney's persistent offensive or intem-
perate tone or manner is a burden for which there is no 
authority beyond the majority's ipsi dixit. 
Furthermore, the proceeding in progress in the respondent 
court was unquestionably a proper inquiry for the purpose 
of determining whether the minds of the particular jurors 
approached by Mrs. Hill had become prejudiced so that the 
trial should not proceed. The court correctly announced that 
Mrs. Hill was not on trial. In that proceeding the court had I 
no power to mete out punishment to Mrs. Hill, nor was it 
sitting as a committing magistrate. Her attorney had no 
proper place in the proceeding unless Mrs. Hill was called to 
the witness stand, which she was not, in which event he might i 
then counsel her concerning her rights and make appropriate 
objections. In fnet, the majority opinion concedes that the 
trial court correctly ruled that Mrs. Hill and lwr attorney 
had no rig"ht to participate in the proceeding. There was no 
ruling or order of thc court which might be said to have 
changed the natllre of the investigation. The cases followed 
in the majority opinion (Ourran v. Superinr Court, 72 Cal. 
.A.pp. 258 [236 P. 975) ; Platnaucr Y. Superior 001trt, 32 Cnl. 
App.463 [163 P. 237) ; and In re Shortridge, G Cnl.App. 371 
[90 P. 478]) from nil that appeared in the order or the I 
record, involved the persistence of an attorney in adYocating 
a point which he had a right to make in a trial where he had 
the rig"ht and the duty to be. The present C.'lse involves the 
officious and persistent disobedience of an order excluding the 
attorn~y from participation in a proceeding where he had no 
right and where interference would bccloud the issue and 
unnecessarily prolong the investigation. 
It is but to cavil with the facts to state that the only 
foundation for the contempt order was the incident which 
occurred after the judge ordered Mrs. Hill to be taken to the 
district attorney. The petitioner's remarks at that time were 
but the culmination of his persistent and officious conduct 
from which he had been properly advised by the court to 
refrain. On this view of the record it is unnecessary to con-
f;ider whether the words uttered by the petitioner were in 
themselves disn'spcctful or wbether, as a separate question, 
the findinb'S that they were loud, boisterous, contemptuous, 
~mcering, etc., Vlere alone sufficient to constitute a ('.Ontcmpt. 
Where the basie conduct of tbe attorney is impropc:>r, and is 
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t11(' court, we have a situation which is ruled by the Hallinan, 
Hose and other cases attempted to be distinv,uishl'd, :lUd the 
Ollelll:;iveness of manner thereupon becomes merely cumu-
lative, 
In my opinion the order should be nftlrmcd. 
Edmonds, J" and Spence, J" concurred. 
